In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks

tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from
data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before
checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.

A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can
therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.

KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING
request reached that path:

BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()

Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection
so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the
parser looks at data[i + 1].