NVD Vulnerability Detail
Search Exploit, PoC
CVE-2026-47065
Summary

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

Assessment: Fully addressed.

When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .

ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

Assessment: Fully addressed.

For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers

Both issues have been fixed.

Publication Date June 3, 2026, 8:16 p.m.
Registration Date June 4, 2026, 4:16 a.m.
Last Update June 3, 2026, 8:16 p.m.
CVSS3.1 : CRITICAL
スコア 9.8
Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
攻撃元区分(AV) ネットワーク
攻撃条件の複雑さ(AC)
攻撃に必要な特権レベル(PR) 不要
利用者の関与(UI) 不要
影響の想定範囲(S) 変更なし
機密性への影響(C)
完全性への影響(I)
可用性への影響(A)
Related information, measures and tools
Common Vulnerabilities List